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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
VOI AIONO and CHERYL AIONO, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
KENDALL HOGAN, STATE FARM 
INSURANCE, and DOES 1 through 
50, inclusive, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
CASE NO. 20040769 CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1 Whether the trial court erred by granting Kendall Hogan's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
Standard of Review: "[The Court of Appeals] reviews] the district court's order 
granting . . . summary judgment for correctness and accord no deference to the district 
court's legal conclusions. [Citations omitted.] [The Court of Appeals] view[s] the facts and 
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party." Brigham Young University v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., aka Tremco Legal 
Solutions^ 2005 UT 10. 
- 1 -
Citation to Record: Order Granting Summary Judgment (R. 71-72) 
2. Whether the trial court erred by denying Aionos' Motion to Amend their 
complaint. 
Standard of Review: Because the trial court denied plaintiffs/appellants' motion to 
amend their complaint in the same order it granted defendants/appellees' motion for 
summary judgment, the Court of Appeals applies an '"abuse of discretion' standard and 
'analyze[s] each of the trial court's reasons for denying [the] motion to amend in light of rule 
15's liberal standard,' despite the fact that one of its reasons was that 'joining the [defendant] 
would be futile [because the statute of limitations had run.]" Gary Porter Construction v. 
Fox Construction, Inc., 2004 UT App 354. 
Citation to Record: Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend (R. 44-45); plaintiffs' Memorandum 
in Support of Motion to Amend or for Additional Time (R. 46-48); and plaintiffs' Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend (R. 56-58). 
3. Whether the trial court erred by denying Aionos' Alternative Motion for 
Additional Time. 
Standard of Review: Where a trial court may exercise broad discretion, the Court of 
Appeals presumes the correctness of the court's decision absent 'manifest injustice or 
inequity that indicates a clear abuse of. . . discretion.' Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d 1055 
(Utah App. 1987). 
Citation to Record: Plaintiffs Motion to Amend; or in the Alternative Motion for 
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Additional Time (R. 44-45) 
4. Whether the trial court erred by dismissing Aionos1 complaint in toto when 
State Farm was not a movant in Kendall's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Standard of Review: "Because summary judgment, by definition, decides only 
questions of law, [the Court of Appeals] reviewfs] the trial court's conclusions of law for 
correctness. [The Court of Appeals] give[s] no deference to the trial court's determination 
of issues on summary judgment. Callahan v. Sheaffer, 877 P 2d 1259 (Utah Ct App 1994) 
Citation to Record: plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend 
(R. 56-58); Kendall Hogan's motion for summary judgment (R. 41-43); and Kendall Hogan's 
memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment. (R. 28-40) 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 [1992]; Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 [1992]; Utah Code 
Ann. § 31A-22-201 [1985]; Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-301(5) [2003]; Utah Code Ann. §§ 
31A-22-303 to 304 [2003]; Utah Code Ann. § 3 lA-22-303(l)(a)(ii) [2003]; and Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, Rules 15(a) and (c) and 56(c) and (f). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The auto accident giving rise to the cause of action by appellants occurred on July 18, 
1996. (R. 1-6) A complaint was filed in the Third District Court, Murray Department, on 
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or about July 14, 2000 in Case No. 000206066.1 (Addendum, Appendix 1) On Marchl2, 
2002, this case was dismissed by the Third District Court, Murray Department, for failure 
to prosecute the action. (Addendum, Appendix 1) On or about March 10, 2003, appellants 
filed their complaint against appellees. (R. 1-6) On Jul> 8, 2003, Voi Aiono and Cheryl 
Aiono ("Aionos") filed a Rule 6(b) motion for enlargement of time (for 60 additional days) 
to serve appellees, which was granted by the Court. (R. 7-10 & 11-12) On August 3, 2003, 
Kendall Hogan ("Kendall") was served (R. 14-15) and through his insured filed and answer 
and jury demand on November 10, 2003. (R. 17-21) On January 30, 2004, the parties filed 
their stipulated discovery plan. (R. 22-24) On April 5, 2004, a motion for summary 
judgment was filed which only named Kendall as the party to the summary judgment; State 
Farm Insurance was not and never named as a party seeking summary judgment. (R. 41-43) 
Kendall's memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment also failed to mention 
defendant State Farm Insurance. (R. 28-40) On April 15, 2004, appellants filed a motion 
to amend; or in the alternative motion for additional time and an accompanying 
memorandum in support. (R. 44-45 & 46-48) On April 26, 2004, Kendall filed an 
opposition to plaintiffs motion to amend; or in the alternative motion for additional time 
Addendum, Appendix 1, is a certified copy from the Clerk of the Third District 
Court, signifying that an action had been filed on July 14, 2000 (prior to the expiration of 
the four-year statute of limitations) by Voi Aiono and Cheryl Aiono, plaintiffs, against 
Kendall Hogan and State Farm Insurance, defendants, Case No. 000206066. As can be 
seen, these are the identical parties to those in the present case. That case was dismissed 
March 12, 2002, for lack of prosecution (not on the merits); hence, § 78-12-40, U.C.A., 
applies. 
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(R. 49-55) which was replied to by memorandum on May 14, 2004. (R. 56-58) On August 
3,2004, the trial court entered an order granting summary judgment and further ordered that 
plaintiffs' complaint "is hereby dismissed" even though no summary judgment was sought 
for defendant State Farm Insurance. (R. 71-72) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The auto accident giving rise to the cause of action by appellants occurred on 
July 18, 1996. 
2. In the police report of the accident (exhibit B to the answer) (R. 17-21 - which 
does not appear to include the exhibits for the record) under the Teresa Peterson portion of 
such report, Teresa was listed as the driver and State Farm Insurance was listed as the 
insurance company with an expiration date of August 28, 1996. This police report is 
included in the Addendum, Appendix 2. 
3. A complaint was filed in the Third District Court, Murray Department, on or 
about July 14, 2000 in Case No. 000206066. In that complaint, State Farm Insurance was 
named as a separate defendant. (Addendum, Appendix 1) 
4. On Marchl2, 2002, this case was dismissed by the Third District Court, 
Murray Department, for failure to prosecute the action. This dismissal was not on the merits. 
(Addendum, Appendix 1) 
5. On or about March 10,2003, Aionos filed their complaint in the Third District 
Court against appellees, again naming State Farm Insurance as a defendant, separate and 
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apart from Kendall, based upon 1st party liability. The complaint listed two paragraphs 
concerning Doe defendants, alleging that these defendants were the agents of each other. 
(R. 1-6) 
6. On July 8, 2003, Aionos filed a Rule 6(b) motion for enlargement of time to 
serve appellees. This motion for enlargement was timely and requested 60 additional days 
to serve appellees. (R. 7-10) 
7. On July 9, 2003, the trial court granted Aionos' Rule 6(b) motion, allowing 
appellants 60 days to serve appellees. (R. 11-12)) 
8. On August 3,2003 and within the 60-day period, Kendall was served. (R. 14-
15) 
9. On or about November 10, 2003, Kendall filed an answer and jury demand. 
(R. 17-21) 
10. On January 30, 2004, the parties filed their stipulated discovery plan. (R. 22-
24) All fact discovery was to be completed by July 1, 2004 and amendments to pleadings 
had to be filed by July 1, 2004. (R. 22-24) 
11. On April 5,2004, prior to the discovery cutoff date of July 1,2004 (R. 22-24), 
Kendall filed a motion for summary judgment only naming Kendall as the party to the 
summary judgment; no similar motion for summary judgment was filed in behalf of State 
Farm Insurance and it was not named as a party seeking summary judgment. (R. 41-43) 
12. Kendall's memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment also failed 
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to mention defendant State Farm Insurance as a party seeking summary judgment. (R. 28-
40) 
13. On April 15, 2004, Aionos filed a motion to amend; or in the alternative 
motion for additional time seeking to amend their complaint in order to name Teresa R. 
Peterson, the driver, as an additional defendant. (R. 44-45) 
14. On April 15, 2004, Aionos also filed a memorandum in support of motion to 
amend or for additional time. (R. 46-48) 
15. On April 26,2004, Kendall filed an opposition to plaintiffs motion to amend; 
or in the alternative motion for additional time. (R. 49-55) 
16. On May 14, 2004, Aionos filed a reply memorandum in support of their 
motion to amend. (R. 56-58) 
17. On August 3, 2004, the trial court entered an order granting summary 
judgment and further ordered that plaintiffs' complaint "is hereby dismissed" even though 
no summary judgment was sought for or in behalf of defendant State Farm Insurance. (R. 
71-72) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
An initial complaint was timely filed in the Third District Court, Murray Department 
on July 14, 2000, the auto accident ("accident") giving rise to the complaint occurring on 
July 18, 1996. This case was subsequently dismissed for lack of prosecution and an 
additional case was filed less than a year after the dismissal in the Third District Court. Both 
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complaints named State Farm Insurance ("State Farm") as a separate and distinct defendant 
since it insured both plaintiffs and defendants. State Farm had a duty to not only defend 
Kendall but the driver of Kendall's automobile, Teresa R. Peterson ("Teresa"), in this suit. 
Spews v. Fricke, 2004 UT 69, 98 P.3d 28. Because State Farm was notified of the pending 
action through letters from counsel and at the time of the suit being filed and served on 
Kendall, and because of State Farm's obligation to defend Kendall and Teresa, State Farm's 
knowledge concerning the lawsuit and the facts of the case should be imputed to Teresa, 
thereby giving her constructive knowledge of the suit and her role therein so Aiono's 
amendment would not prejudice her and would relate back to the date of the filing of the 
original complaint. Both had the right to have State Faim defend them. "[A] person in 
privity with another . . . is a person so identified in interest with another that he represents 
the same legal right." Brigham Young University, supra. In effect, Teresa was a co-insured 
of Kendall, having the same legal right as he does to be defended by State Farm. See 
Spews, supra. Therefore, since Teresa would not be prejudiced by the amendment, the trial 
court should have granted Aionos' Motion to Amend the Complaint to include Teresa as an 
additional defendant due to the relation back effect. Under the requirements of Rule 56(f), 
the trial court should have allowed Aionos a continuance in order to engage in discovery 
concerning that facts of this case and to counter the affidavit of Kendall by State Farm's 
knowledge imputed to Teresa. State Farm Insurance, as the insurer of the vehicle, was 
obliged to insure the driver in this accident. Spews v. Fricke, 2004 UT 69, 98 P.3d 28, 34-
-8-
40. See also Exhibit A to Kendall's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment, which is the affidavit of Kendall Hogan containing Exhibit B, a copy of the 
police report, first page of police report, naming State Farm Insurance as the insurer of 
Kendall's vehicle. (Addendum, Appendix 2) The record contains no statement by Kendall 
that Teresa should not have been covered by State Farm Insurance, since his affidavit does 
not address any facts whether Teresa ever drove with his knowledge. His affidavit seems 
to indicate the foreseeability of Ms. Peterson driving the vehicle owned by Kendall. (R. 33-
34) 
Because of it decree that there was no "unity of interest", the trial court erred by 
ruling that Aionos' Motion to Amend their complaint would not relate back to the date of 
the filing of the complaint and is time-barred. Finally, the trial court erred by dismissing 
Aionos' complaint in toto since Kendall's Motion for Summary Judgment was not brought 
in the name of defendant State Farm Insurance and no such judgment was sought for State 
Farm Insurance. Since State Farm Insurance is a party to Aionos' action, their action against 
State Farm Insurance should not have been dismissed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING 
KENDALLS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
In this case, this Court's standard of review is "for correctness and accord no 
deference to the [district] court's legal conclusions. In addition, [this Court] views] the facts 
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and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party." Brigham Young University v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., aka Tremco Legal 
Solutions, Inc., 2005 UT 10. The complaint named Kendall Hogan, State Farm Insurance, 
and Does 1 through 50, inclusive, as defendants. (R. 1-6) State Farm Insurance was the 
insurer of plaintiffs and defendants and, as such, owed a duty to plaintiffs to deal fairly with 
them and act in good faith. (R. 1-6) The complaint then alleged that State Farm Insurance 
breached their duty of good faith and fair dealing with plaintiffs. (R. 1-6) Yet, the trial 
court dismissed the whole complaint, including State Farm Insurance, even though Kendall 
was the only movant for summary judgment. (R. 71-72) Aionos complaint against State 
Farm Insurance should not have been dismissed. Additionally, as will be developed herein, 
Aionos complaint should not have been dismissed against Kendall and the Doe defendants. 
Because of the dismissal with prejudice of Aionos5 complaint, it is apparent the trial court 
failed to view the facts in a light most favorable to the Aionos and failed to accord their 
complaint the deference that was due. 
A. Kendall's Affidavit Failed To Provide Any Basis For The Granting 
Of Summary Judgment 
Kendall's Motion for Summary Judgment was supposedly supported by his affidavit 
attached as an exhibit in his supporting memorandum. (R. 28-40) In that affidavit, Kendall 
admitted that "on July 18, 1996 [sic] that automobile was in possession and control of my 
son Jonathan who was then residing at the home of Teresa R. Peterson." He also stated that 
"on July 18, 1996 [sic] I had not given Ms. Peterson permission to drive my 1981 Datsun 
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510 automobile". (R. 33-34) Since Kendall authorized his son to have the possession and 
control of his Datsun and his son lived with Teresa, it was entirely foreseeable that Teresa 
would be driving the Datsun on that date and other dates. Kendall's affidavit fails to state 
that he had no knowledge of her driving the 1981 Datsun 510 automobile on July 18, 1996. 
The facts of the present case are remarkably similar to the facts in Spews v. Fricke, 
2004 UT 69, 98 P.3d 28. There, a Jeep automobile owned and driven by Fricke was 
involved in an accident. Fricke, who was driving, was found not negligent. Prior to the 
accident, she had given a ride to Hiatt, who was a passenger in the automobile at the time 
of the accident. While riding in the car, passenger Hiatt asked Fricke to take him to her 
house (they had just left a nightclub together). An argument ensued and shortly "after 
passing the road to Fricke's home, Hiatt suddenly and without warning reached over and 
grabbed the Jeep's steering wheel." Consequently, "the Jeep veered into oncoming traffic 
and crashed into a Honda Civic driven by Ted Speros, injuring him." In a subsequent suit, 
Nationwide, Fricke's insurer, defended the claims against itself and Fricke, but refused to 
defend Hiatt. A default judgment was entered against Hiatt. 
Nationwide argued it had no duty to defend Hiatt because he was not a permissive 
user and was further excluded from coverage because of the intentional acts inclusion in the 
policy of insurance. The trial court agreed with Nationwide and held that Speros' insurer, 
West American, lacked standing to proceed directly against Nationwide because of a "lack 
of privity of contract between the parties". The trial court also ruled that Hiatt was not a 
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permissive user within the terms of Nationwide's policy. The Utah Supreme Court stated 
that "West American's right to obtain reimbursement from Nationwide for the property 
damage and rental car expense payments it made to Speros is governed by the principles of 
equitable subrogation", citing § 31A-22-201, U.C.A., as authority. The Supreme Court then 
stated that West American "must establish that the damages arising from Hiatt' s actions were 
covered by the Nationwide policy". 
In response to Nationwide's argument that Hiatt was not a permissive user, the 
Supreme Court stated that the "issue turns on whether the term 'permission' contemplates 
coverage for the actions of a person permitted to use a car generally, or rather is limited to 
those persons who have permission to take the particular actions immediately giving rise to 
liability". Nationwide further argued that Hiatt's grabbing and turning the steering wheel 
disqualified him from permissive user status under the teims of their policy. In declining 
Nationwide's argument, the Supreme Court stated: 
The controlling statutory language does not limit permissive users to 
those who are given permission to drive or 'operate' a vehicle. 'Operator' is 
a defined term under the statute. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 3 lA-22-301(5), 41-
12a-103 (8) [2003]. However, the legislature chose not to use this term to 
describe the mandatory coverage at issue here. WTiile the legislature could 
have required liability policies to cover permissive 'operators,' it chose instead 
to mandate coverage for permissive 'users.' We are persuaded that the 
legislature selected the term 'user' advisedly and with the intention that it 
apply more broadly than the term 'operator.' [Citations omitted.] 
Our interpretation of 'permissive user' is also supported by a related 
provision of the insurance code. The code prevents an insurer from 
withdrawing the coverage it is required to extend to permissive users on the 
basis that the permissive user was at fault in causing an accident. See Utah 
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Code Ann. § 31A-22-303 (l)(a)(iii)(A) [2003]. Our interpretation prevents 
insurers from frustrating this provision by categorizing as unauthorized 
those actions giving rise to fault [Emphasis added ] 
Practical considerations also support our reading of the statutory 
language. The construction proposed by Nationwide would give rise to 
circumstances where a person using someone else's vehicle could move in 
and out of the zone of permissiveness from moment to moment Such an 
interpretation would spawn fact-dependent disputes over whether•, at the 
relevant moment(s), a user had permission to undertake the particular 
action(s) that caused an accident. [Emphasis added] For example, the typical 
automobile owner does not authorize permissive users to exceed speed limits, 
run red lights, drive recklessly, or engage in any negligent or ill-advised 
actions. Under the interpretation urged by Nationwide, a person driving 
someone else's automobile with permission, but without permission to act 
negligently, would find himself without liability coverage. . . . 
Id at 35-36. 
Kendall's affidavit specifically states that Teresa was not given permission to drive 
his automobile on July 18, 1996. (R. 33-34) Its silence regarding any other days assumes 
she had permission to drive his automobile on days other than July 18, 1996. Such attempts 
to disqualify Teresa from coverage on the day in question are tantamount to allowing Teresa 
to "move in and out of the zone of permissiveness from moment to moment". Such 
interpretation is clearly adverse to the ruling of the Utah Supreme Court in Speros v. Fricke, 
and the applicable above-cited Utah statutes. 
The Supreme Court then discussed Nationwide's argument that Hiatt should not be 
covered because of the "intentional acts" exclusion. Even though the complaint in the 
present case alleged no intentional acts, what the Supreme Court stated in this regard is 
apposite to the present case. Nationwide argued that Hiatt's intentionally grabbing the 
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steering wheel thereby changing the Jeep's direction of travel into an oncoming car made 
him ineligible for their coverage. The Supreme Court disagreed: 
The Utah legislature has enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme 
mandating minium liability coverage for motor vehicles. See id. §§ 31A-22-
303 to 304. This legislative enactment reflects a public policy requiring 
vehicle owners to carry a minimum level of liability coverage to protect 
innocent victims of automobile accidents. In the case of an owner's liability 
policy, the statute requires that the policy insure the person named in the 
policy and any permissive users 'against loss from the liability imposed by law 
for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of these motor 
vehicles within the United States and Canada . . . in [dollar] amounts not less 
than the minimum limits specified. Id. § 31A-22-303(l)(a)(ii) [Emphasis in 
original.] 
The statute recognizes no distinction between liability arising out of 
negligent acts and liability arising out of intentional acts; it simply requires 
coverage for all liabilities imposed by law. Because the law imposes liability 
for damages caused by negligently and intentionally, we conclude that the 
statute requires coverage of liability arising out of intentional, as well as 
negligent, acts. 
. . . . Accordingly, we hold that the intentional acts exclusion is enforceable 
against accident victims up to the minimum liability limits prescribed by the 
statute. 
Our holding with respect to the limited validity of the intentional acts 
exclusion is consistent with our holdings regarding the validity of other 
exclusions in the arena of automobile liability coverage, hi Allstate Insurance 
Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 619 P.2d 329 (Utah 1980), we 
considered the validity of a named driver exclusion to an automobile liability 
insurance policy. After then analyzing the then-applicable statutory scheme 
and concluding that the legislature had established a mandatory minimum 
liability coverage requirement for automobile insurance policies, we held that 
the exclusion was Void in relation to the minimum level of liability coverage 
mandated' by statute. Id. at 333. 
Similarly, in Farmers Insurance Exchange v Call, 712 P.2d 231 (Utah 
1985), we examined the validity of a policy provision that excluded coverage 
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for bodily injury to members of the insured's household. We held that the 
exclusion contravened the statutory requirement mandating minimum benefits 
that must be provided to all persons sustaining personal injuries in automobile 
accidents. . . . We concluded that it 'would be anomalous if the rights of 
innocent accident victims, for whose protection the Utah No-Fault Act was 
adopted, could be defeated by private agreements. Id. at 235. [Emphasis 
added.] 
Id. at 36-38. 
These citations from Spews v. Fricke clearly demonstrate that the attempt by Kendall 
in his affidavit to disqualify Teresa from coverage by State Farm Insurance are contrary to 
the above-cited statutes and the holdings in Spews v. Fricke. To now hold otherwise would 
abrogate the rights of the Aionos, the innocent victims of Teresa's negligence. At a 
minimum, Aionos are entitled to the benefit of the Utah No-Fault Act and to that Act's 
requirement mandating that they receive minimum benefits. Consequently, the trial court 
erred by granting summary judgment against Aionos based upon Kendall's affidavit since 
Kendall failed to demonstrate that he was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 
By the authority of the above-cited statutes and Spews v. Fricke, State Farm had a duty to 
defend Teresa, thereby making her a permissive user, contrary to Kendall's assertions in his 
affidavit. 
Rule 56(c), U.R.Civ.P., states that "[t]he judgment sought shall be rendered if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admission on file, together with 
affidavits, if any, show that there is not genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The trial court erred in granting 
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summary judgment. State Farm had a duty to defend Kendall and Teresa and its knowledge 
concerning the accident and the filing of the complaint because of the accident in which 
Teresa was involved as a driver should be imputed to Teresa thereby demonstrating that the 
amendment would not prejudice her and should relate back. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING 
AIONOS' MOTION TO AMEND THEIR 
COMPLAINT 
Once confronted with Kendall's Motion for Summary Judgment, Aionos filed a 
motion to amend their complaint to include Teresa along with a supporting memorandum. 
(R. 44-45, 46-48) The trial court denied this motion in its Order Granting Summary 
Judgment. (R. 71-72) 
Rule 15(a) indicates that "leave [to amend] shall be freely given when justice so 
requires." As indicated by the above-referenced Utah No-Fault Act and Spews, supra, 
justice requires that Aionos be compensated for their injuries as a result of the negligence 
of Teresa. 
The Order Granting Summary Judgment stated that ?,Plaintiffs, Motion to amend 
Complaint is hereby denied as there is not a unity of interest between Defendant Kendall 
Hogan and the actual tortfeasor which would allow the relation back of the Amended 
Complaint to the previous filings of the Complaint. Accordingly, any amended complaint 
that would be filed by Plaintiff [sic] would be time barred by the statute of limitations set 
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forth pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-12-25 and § 78-12-40, respectively." In effect, the trial court 
ruled that it would be futile for Aionos to amend their complaint to include Teresa as a 
defendant even though the claim asserted in the amended pleading "arose out of the conduct, 
transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading". 
Rule 15(c) states that the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading 
"[w]henever the claim . . . asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, 
transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading". 
Aionos' amended complaint only sought to add Teresa as a party. Everything else 
would remain as alleged in the original complaint arising out of the accident of July 18, 
1996. (R. 44-45 and memorandum in support R. 46-48) As such, the trial court erred by 
denying Aionos' Motion to Amend Complaint. 
A. Notification Of The Lawsuit To State Farm Was Constructive Notice To 
Teresa So As To Satisfy The Requirement Of Rule 15(c) 
In Gary Porter Construction v. Fox Construction, Inc., 2004 UT App 354, ^ 34, 
regarding the application of Rule (c) to add new parties, the Utah Court of Appeals stated: 
. . . The Court recognized that rule 15(c) generally does 'not apply to an 
amendment which . . . adds new parties' because if it did, 'the purpose of a 
statute of limitations would be defeated,' but also recognized that 'a 
mechanical use of a statute of limitations [should not] prevent adjudication of 
a claim' where 'new and old parties have an identity of interest; so it can be 
assumed or proved the relation back is not prejudicial. [Doxey-Layton, 548 
P.2d 902, 906 (Utah 1976)] 'Such is particularly valid where . . . the real 
parties in interest were sufficiently alerted to the proceedings, or were 
involved in them unofficially, from an early stage.' Id Where a new party 
had sufficient notice that it would have been a proper party to the original 
pleading, the purpose of the statute of limitations is not defeated by applying 
-17-
the relation back doctrine to deprive the new party of its statute of limitations 
defense. 
The Court of Appeals, in quoting Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 
214 (Utah 1984), referenced the fact that the Utah Supreme Court, in Perry, outlined a test 
for "identity of interest": "[W]hen Tthe parties are so closely related in their business 
operations that notice of the action against one serves to provide notice of the action to the 
other." Id at f^ 35. After Perry, this court stated that the notice for relation back could be 
actual notice or constructive notice. This court further stated: "No matter how the formal 
test is articulated, what is crucial is that at an adequately early stage of the litigation, the new 
party was 'sufficiently on notice of the facts and claims that gave rise to the proposed 
amendment/ 
This court in Gary Porter Construction, cited two cases where it had permitted 
relation back "where the new party had sufficient actual notice that it would have been a 
proper party under the original pleading. In Hebertson v. Bank One, Utah, N.A., 1999 UT 
App 342, 995 P.2d 7, this court stated that relation back would be proper where the new 
parties (1) had actual notice of the original pleading, which clearly described an injury that 
had occurred at the time the new parties owned the property on which the injury had 
occurred, and (2) had the same insurer and attorney as the named party,. . ." Id. at ^ 37. 
In the instant case, Teresa was aware of the accident since she was the one involved. 
She was or should have been aware that Aionos were injured. Teresa was insured by State 
Farm as was Kendall and had the same attorney as Kendall and State Farm, i.e., as a result 
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of the Spews opinion. Consequently, a relation back to the date of the filing of the original 
complaint would not prejudice her. Again, the trial court erred by not granting Aionos' 
Motion to Amend. 
The Gary Porter Construction court articulated a test in spite of terminological shifts 
for relation back under rule 15(c): 
[W]hether (1) the amended pleading alleged only claims that arose out of the 
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the 
original pleading and (2) the added party had received (actual or constructive) 
notice that it would have been a proper party to the original pleading such that 
no prejudice would result from preventing the new party from using a statute 
of limitations defense that otherwise would have been available. 
Id at If 40. 
The Gary Porter Construction court then stated what is directly applicable to the 
present case and ignored by the trial court: 
However, a consideration not addressed by the trial court but that could be 
relevant to imputing notice to a new party, is whether it shared counsel with 
a named party prior to the running of the statute of limitations. See 
Hebertson v. Bank One, Utah N.A, 1999 UT App 342, % 19 n. 9, 995 P.2d 7 
(considering having the same attorney and insurance carrier relevant to 
relation back analysis). [Emphasis added.] 
Id at Tf 44. 
In the instant case under the analysis of the Spews case, Teresa should be found to 
have imputed notice since she shared counsel with Kendall and had the same insurance 
carrier as Kendall. As a result of this imputed notice, Teresa would not be prejudiced by the 
relation back to the date of Aionos' original complaint; consequently, the trial court erred by 
not granting Aionos* Motion to Amend. 
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In Korn v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Line, Inc., 724 F.2d 1397, 1399 (9th Cir.1984), 
the Court of Appeals stated that "Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c) is the only vehicle through which a 
plaintiff may amend his complaint, after a statute of limitation period has run, to accurately 
name a defendant who was not correctly named in the pleading before the limitation period 
had run". Such applies to the instant case. 
In Korn, Mr. Korn slipped and fell on the basketball court of the cruise ship M/S 
"Song of Norway," injuring his knee to the extent that he had to cut his cruise short and fly 
to California for knee surgery. His attorney eventually sued Royal Caribbean Cruise Line, 
Inc. (RCCL Inc.) and other doe defendants. Ultimately, Kornfs attorney discovered, after 
the statute of limitations had run, that RCCL Inc. was not the owner of the vessel, only its 
marketing corporation. Korn then attempted to amend his original complaint to name the 
proper party defendant, Royal Caribbean Cruise Line A/S. The district court denied the 
motion. 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court. It reiterated that the notice "required 
under Rule 15(c) could be either formal or informal so long as the party to be added was not 
prejudiced in maintaining its defense on the merits". Id. at 1399. 
In finding that Royal Caribbean Cruise Line A/S (RCCL A/S) was not prejudiced 
because, among other particulars, of informal notice to it, the Ninth Circuit stated: 
. . . . In the instant matter, only one person was injured in a fall on the basket 
ball court of the M/S "Song of Norway" that particular morning. Only one 
person was treated for knee injuries sustained in that fall and only one person 
subsequently curtailed his cruise, and that of his family, to fly from Puerto 
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Rico to California to undergo surgery. Most importantly, when the insurance 
company involved inquired into the facts surrounding this matter, only one 
person's claim was involved - that person was Julius Korn and his claim was 
the focal point of the investigation. 
RCCL A/S should not be allowed to utilize Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c) as a log to hide 
behind. CMA, RCCL A/S' agent for claims purposes, knew full well of the 
pending suit and had been notified that the complaint was filed before the 
expiration of the limitation period. 
Id at 1401. 
The Ninth Circuit identified CMA as the insurer for the vessel's owner. 
In the instant matter, Aionos were the only ones injured at the time of the accident. 
(R. 1-6) When State Farm inquired into the facts surrounding these injuries, only Aionos' 
claim was involved. Teresa was or should have been aware that she and the Aionos were 
involved in the accident on July 18, 1996. (R. 1-6) Correspondence was sent by Aionos' 
attorney to State Farm regarding the accident, reflecting that State Farm was fully aware of 
the accident and the identity of the persons injured. Again, since State Farm insured Kendall 
and Teresa and provided the attorney for both of them, State Farm had actual knowledge of 
the accident of July 18, 1996, and the driver driving its insured automobile; therefore, such 
knowledge should be imputed to Teresa. 
See Craig v. Ludy, 95 Wn. App.715, 719-20, 976 P.2d 1248 (1999) ["At least one 
federal court has held under this rule that notice may be imputed to parties who are 
represented by the same attorney." Hendrix v. Memorial Hosp., 776 F.2d 1255,1257-58 (5th 
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Cir. 1985). "In this case, Mr. Ludy's insurer certainly had notice of this action. Presumably, 
counsel retained by the insurer to represent its insured would be required to defend the suit 
regardless of whether Mr. Ludy were alive or dead." Id. at 720.] 
Kendall and Teresa were represented by the same attorney and State Farm certainly 
had notice of this action. Consequently, notice of the action should be imputed to Teresa 
and a relation back would not prejudice her. 
In accord, Schwartz v. Douglas, 98 Wn. App. 836, 840, 991 P.2d 665 (2000) ["After 
receiving its copy of the complaint, the insurance carrier asked for an extension and did not 
notify the Schwartzes of Mr. Douglas' death until after the running of the statute of 
limitations. Counsel retained by the insurer would have been required to defend this suit 
whether Mr. Douglas or for his estate after he died. Due to this community of interest, the 
notice to the insurer is imputed to the estate."] In the instant case, counsel retained by State 
Farm would have been required to defend this suit for Kendall and Teresa. Therefore, notice 
to State Farm is imputed to Teresa. In accord, Zimmer v. United Dominion Industries, Inc., 
(W.D.Ark.2000); Pargman v. Vickers, 438 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 13, 96 P.3d 571, 433 Ariz. Adv. 
Rep. 20 (Ariz.App. 2004) [Since the insurer had notice of the plaintiffs action and 
knowledge of the plaintiffs mistake of failing to name the real party in interest, an amended 
complaint could be allowed.] 
In Hamilton v. Blackman, 915 P.2d 1210 (Alaska 1996), plaintiffs were in an auto 
accident where the driver of the other vehicle died. Plaintiffs submitted their claim to the 
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driver's liability insurer; however, before their claim became time barred, plaintiffs sued the 
deceased driver and served his wife as the estate's personal representative, even though she 
had never been appointed such by any probate court. Id. at 1212. The original defendant 
(the deceased driver) was represented by a law firm retained by the insurer that moved to 
dismiss asserting that plaintiffs failed to sue the proper party. Id. The trial court agreed and 
dismissed the case. However, the Alaska Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 1218, finding that 
plaintiffs were entitled to petition the probate court for the appointment of a personal 
representative and to move to amend their complaint to add the estate. The Alaska Supreme 
Court explained that the "touchstone" of the relation back doctrine was fairness. It also 
noted that it appeared that the driver's insurer had actual notice and knowledge of the 
lawsuit; therefore, the relation back requirements were met: 
It is the Estate of William Blackmon, not State Farm, that [plaintiffs] will seek 
to bring into the case when they sue the estate's personal representative. As 
the estate has not yet been opened it could not have notice of the claim against 
it; it would therefore be impossible to satisfy the literal terms of Civil Rule 
15(c). Howevery State Farm is the only entity with exposure for damages 
liability as the result of [plaintiffs9] action. Under these circumstances, 
actual notice to State Farm suffices to meet the notice requirements of Civil 
Rule 15(c). [Emphasis added.] 
Id at 1218 n. 12. 
One of the most direct cases holding that knowledge to the insurer of the party to be 
added constitutes knowledge to such party is Red Arrow Stables v. Velasquez, 725 N.E.2d 
110 (Ind.App.2000). In that case, Velasquez, an injured plaintiff, filed suit against the 
wrong group of Girl Scouts. When he became aware of his mistake, he moved to amend his 
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mistake to sue the right group of Girl Scouts, which motion was granted. The new party 
then twice filed motions for summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds, which 
motions were denied by the trial court. These rulings were appealed. 
The Indiana Appellate Court then decided the issue of whether constructive notice 
to the added defendant is sufficient to satisfy the notice requirements of Trial Rule 15(c), 
stating, as follows: 
Other jurisdictions addressing the issue of whether notice to a party's 
liability insurance carrier, by itself, is sufficient to allow relation back of an 
amendment have answered in the affirmative. In Smith, the plaintiff fell and 
suffered injuries while at Hardee's Restaurant. Smith v. TWService, Inc., 142 
F.R.D. 144, 145 (M.D.Tenn.1991). Counsel for the plaintiff contacted the 
insurance adjusters for Hardee's, advising them of the accident and of 
counsel's representation of the plaintiff. Id. at some point, TW (Hardee's 
licensee) assumed the handling of plaintiff s claim, and plaintiffs counsel was 
advised to direct all future correspondence to the claims representative of the 
liability insurer for TW. Id. Approximately one week before the statute of 
limitations expired, plaintiff filed suit, naming only Hardee's as a defendant. 
Id. at 146. Despite naming only Hardee's as a defendant, plaintiff did mail 
TW's insurer a copy of the complaint. Id. at 145. After the statute of 
limitations had expired, plaintiff filed a motion to amend her complaint to add 
TW as a defendant. Id. at 146. Because there was no dispute that the 
defendant to be added did not have actual notice of the lawsuit within the 
limitations period but that its insurer did, the only issue was whether the 
notice to the insurer was sufficient to fulfill the requirements for relation 
back under Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 147. 
In holding that plaintiffs motion to amend should be allowed to relate back 
to the date of the original complaint, the court noted that the plaintiff is only 
obligated to provide notice which is sufficient to prevent prejudice in the 
maintenance of a defense. Id. at 149. 
'Intuitively, there is little prejudice to a defendant when his own 
liability insurer, who will likely be heavily involved in the defense, has 
notice of a suit within the limitations period [The insurer] had full 
authority to investigate and settle the claim and would play a key role in the 
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impending litigation. This is not a so-called 'identity of interest' case, but 
there is still a substantial unity of interests between [the insurer] and [the 
added defendant] with respect to this litigation. Id. 
We find the reasoning in Smith to be sound. In the instant case, 
Calumet Council was alerted to Velasquez's accident and her subsequent 
claim for medical expenses by December 1997 at the latest. By January 1998, 
St. Paul, the insurance carrier for Calumet Council, was aware that Velasquez 
had obtained counsel and was making a 'claim for damages.' Upon receipt of 
this information, St. Paul requested that Velasquez's counsel 'direct all future 
correspondence' to it. Approximately three weeks before the statute of 
limitations expired, Velasquez, acting through her attorney, filed suit, 
incorrectly naming the 'Girl Scout Corporation' as defendant rather than the 
'Girl Scouts of Calumet Council.' Within days, Velasquez's attorney notified 
St. Paul of the impending suit by sending a copy of the complaint and 
summons, along with a letter that stated, 'Please find enclosed a file-stamped 
copy of the Complaint and Summons which were filed by our client against 
your insured in the above-named cause.' Although Calumet Council did not 
receive actual notice of the lawsuit until almost two months after the statute 
had run, its insurer, the entity with the 'right to investigate any claim or suit,' 
'the right and duty to defend any claim or suit,' and 'the right to settle any 
claim or suit,' did receive notice of the lawsuit before the tolling of the statute. 
Accordingly, for the same reasons set forth in Smith, we hold that notification 
of the lawsuit to St Paul was constructive notice to Calumet Council so as 
to satisfy the requirement of Trial Rule 15(c)(1); namely, that it received 
notice of the institution of the action such that it will not he prejudiced in 
the maintenance of its suit. [Emphasis added.] 
Id. at 115-116. 
In the instant case, State Farm was aware of the pending suit. It also had 
correspondence with Aionos' attorney. State Farm had the right to investigate the claim, the 
right and duty to defend the suit, and the right to settle any claim or suit, which it did not. 
State Farm was heavily involved in the defense of this suit. At the least, State Farm received 
notice of the filing of the suit prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations when 
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Kendall was served with Summons and Complaint. (R. 14-16) The instant case is 
analogous to the Velasquez case. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING 
AIONOS1 ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR 
ADDITIONAL TIME 
In response to Kendall's Motion for Summary Judgment, Aionos filed a Motion to 
Amend; or in the Alternative Motion for Additional Time. (R. 44-45) Kendall's Motion for 
Summary Judgment was filed on April 5, 2004 (R. 28-43), three months prior to the 
discovery cutoff of July 1, 2004, set forth in the Stipulated Discovery Plan. (R. 22-25) Such 
was necessary to conduct discovery in order to respond to Kendall's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. (R. 44-45) 
Rule 56(f), U.R.Civ.P., provides, "[s]hould it appear from the affidavits of a party 
opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to 
justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a 
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be 
had or may make such other order as is just". The statements in Kendall's affidavit could 
only be controverted by additional discovery. The trial court denied this alternative motion. 
The Stipulated Discovery Plan was not filed until January 30, 2004. Kendall's 
Motion for Summary Judgment was filed April 5, 2004. That gave Aionos only 
approximately two months to conduct discovery, where they would have had an additional 
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three months if Kendall's Motion for Summary Judgment had been filed after the discovery 
cutoff date. (R. 22-25, 28-43) In light of these facts, Aionos were not dilatory regarding 
discovery. Additionally, it would appear disingenuous for a Motion for Summary Judgment 
to be filed prematurely as governed by the terms of the Stipulated Discovery Plan. 
Auerbach's, Inc. v. Kimball 572 P.2d 376 (Utah 1977) is on point. 
The granting of the motion for summary judgment was premature 
because Kimball's discovery was not then complete. It was the information 
sought in the proceedings for discovery, which Kimball claimed would infuse 
the issues with facts sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment, and 
sustain his counter-claim. Whether such would be the case cannot now be 
determined, because such facts, if they exist, were not allowed to be 
discovered. 
When a motion is made opposing summary judgment, on the ground 
that discovery has not been completed, the court should grant a continuance 
or deny the motion for summary judgment; unless the motion in opposition is 
deemed dilatory or without merit. 
Id. at 377. 
Based upon the above-recited facts, Aionos' alternative motion for continuance was 
not dilatory. Consequently, the trial court erred by denying this alternative motion for 
continuance prior to its determining Kendall's motion for summary judgment. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY 
DISMISSING AIONOS1 COMPLAINT IN 
TOTO WHEN STATE FARM WAS NOT A 
MOVANT IN KENDALL'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Kendall's motion for summary judgment listed him as the sole moving party even 
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though State Farm was listed as a defendant and claims were made in the complaint about 
the breach of its duty of good faith and fail* dealing. (R. 1-6) State Farm was the insurer for 
plaintiffs and defendants. (R. 1-6) Yet, the order stated that "Defendant Kendall Hogan's 
Motion for Summaiy Judgment is granted". (R. 71) The order granting summary judgment 
ended with "[accordingly, Plaintiffs' Complaint is hereby dismissed". (R. 72) The trial 
court erred by entering this order since only Kendall moved for summary judgment. 
Rule 56(c), U.R.Civ.P., provides in part: "The judgment sought shall be rendered if 
the pleadings, . . . show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law". [Emphasis added.] 
Since State Farm was not a moving party, the trial court erred by dismissing entirely 
Aionos' complaint. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above-cited cases, statutes, and argument, the trial court erred by 
granting Kendall's motion for summary judgment based upon the futility of a Rule 15(c) 
amendment to name Teresa as a party. Such decision should be reversed. State Farm was 
obliged to defend Teresa in this suit based upon the reasoning and holding of Spews, supra. 
The idea of permissive use for one day only (July 18, 1996) seems too pat, too convenient, 
too self-serving, and ignores the fact of foreseeability that with the automobile being in the 
possession of Jonathan Hogan who was living with Teresa, that she was a permissive user. 
The careful language of Kendall's affidavit supports this contention. No matter, the purpose 
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of the Utah No Fault Act is offended by this characterization of Teresa's use or lack thereof; 
and, according to Speros, such moment to moment zone of permissiveness should not be 
allowed in this case. Aionos should have their day in court and be allowed the opportunity 
to recover damages for their injuries. They should be granted the opportunity to amend their 
complaint to list Teresa as an additional party. Based upon the foregoing, she will not be 
prejudiced thereby and the amended complaint will relate back. 
State Farm was obliged to represent Teresa. State Farm had ample notice prior to the 
filing of the suit that Teresa was the driver and it would have a duty to defend her. In fact, 
the police report (exhibit B to the answer) (R. 17-21 - which does not include the exhibits 
for the record) under the Teresa Peterson portion of such report, listed Teresa as the driver 
and State Farm Insurance was listed as the insurance company with an expiration date of 
August 28, 1996. At the time Kendall was served State Farm knew that (1) the suit against 
Kendall was filed within the statute of limitations; (2) that Teresa had not been named; (3) 
that Teresa was the driver; and (4) the suit was really concerning her liability as set forth in 
the Does allegations in the complaint. (R. 1-6) Consequently, State Farm's knowledge of 
the original filing of the complaint and the facts surrounding it should be imputed to Teresa 
so that an amendment to Aionos' complaint will not prejudice her, resulting in a relation 
back to the date of the filing of the original complaint. The trial court erred by not granting 
Aionos' motion to amend. 
Aionos respectfully request that this Court reverse the decision of the trial court 
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whereby it granted Kendall's motion for summary judgment and denied Aionos' motion to 
amend and remand Aionos' case to the trial court, allowing the amendment and setting aside 
the summary judgment. 
The trial court erred in not granting Aionos a continuance to conduct discovery 
pursuant to Rule 56(f). As such, the decision of the trial court should be reversed 
concerning their continuance motion and Aionos should be allowed to conduct discovery 
in this matter and proceed to trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th day of February, 2005. 
David Drake 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
Voi Aiono and Cheryl Aiono 
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I, the undersigned, hereby certify that on the 5th day of February, 2005, a true aji4 
correct copy of the foregoing brief was mailed, first class postage prepaid, to the following 
counsel of record: 
David N. Mortensen, Esq. 
IVIE & YOUNG 
226 West 2230 North, Suite 210 
Provo, UT 84603 
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Appendix 2. AFFIDAVIT OF KENDALL HOGAV IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
WITH EXHIBITS FILED IN THIRD DISTRICT COURT, 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHERYL AIONO vs. STATE FARM INSURANCE 
CASE NUMBER 000206066 Personal Injury 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
JOSEPH C. FRATTO 
PARTIES 
Plaintiff - VOI AIONO 
Represented by: DAVID O DRAKE 
Plaintiff - CHERYL AIONO 
Represented by: DAVID O DRAKE 
Defendant - KENDALL HOGAN 




07-14-00 Case filed by cristt 
07-14-00 Judge FRATTO assigned. 
07-14-00 Filed: AFFIDAVIT OF IMPECUNIOSITY 
07-18-00 Filed: Aff. of Cheryl Aiaono of Impecuniosity Regarading 
Paymentof Filing Fee and Jury Demand. 
07-18-00 Filed: Aff. of Impecuniosity Regarding Payment of Filing Fee 
and Jury Demand. 
03-12-02 Case Disposition is Dismsd lack prosectn 
Disposition Judge is JOSEPH C. FRATTO 
06-13-02 Note: Archived Physical File CV00012 
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DAVID N. MORTENSEN, #6617 
JARED R. CASPER, #8160 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Defendant 
226 West 2230 North, Suite 110 
P.O. Box 657 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Phone: (801) 375-3000 
Fax: (801)375-3067 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
VOIAIONO and CHERYL AIONO, : AFFIDAVIT OF KENDALL HOGAN IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
Plaintiffs, : JUDGMENT 
vs. : 
KENDALL HOGAN, STATE FARM 
INSURANCE, and DOES 1 through 50, 
inclusive, : Civil No.: 030905421 
Defendants. : Judge Boyden 
Kendall Hogan, upon his oath swears and avers as follows: 
1. I am over the age of 18 and a resident of Utah County, and am of sound mind. 
2. That on July 18,1996 I was the co-owner of a 1981 Datsun 510 automobile. 
3. That on July 18,1996 that automobile was in possession and control of my son 
Jonathan who was then residing at the home of Teresa R. Peterson. 
4. That on July 18,19961 had not given Ms. Peterson permission to drive my 1981 
Datsun 510 automobile. 
5. That on July 18, 19961 was not the driver of my 1981 Datsun 510 automobile 
when it was involved in a motor vehicle accident with Ms. Cheryl Aiono. 
DATED AND SIGNED this $. 5 " day of March, 2004. 
<TRMr>AT.T. WOO ATM 0 KENDALL HOGAN 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss: 
County of Utah ) 
On the 2s* day of March, 2004, personally appeared before me Kendall 
Hogan, the signer of the above Affidavit in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, who 
acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
My Commission Expires: 
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W 
a o/_ 
NEAREST INTERSECTION STREET HOUSE NO LANDMARK 
BE SURE TO COMPLETE IF ROAD HAS MILE POST 
VEHICLE 
* I - £ MAKE MOOEL 5*o BOOY STYLE/TYPE COOE H *"*. l o t 











VEHICLE COLOR G.V.W R. 
DiSPOSmON OF VEHICLE 
COOE 7_ 





L 1 8 5 g p t f . 
l Z . e ^ ' D * u -
LAST 
FIRST INfTIAL LAST 
I ee^e*^ \ £ T 7 T Q ^ > o P 
PARTS DAMAGED 
^ - J ^ 
CASCNUMWfT 
FOR AGENCY US€ 





COMMERCIAL VEKKXE («*) 12.000 t» 
INTERSTATE D INTRASTATE • 
NO. OF AXLES 




STREET, CTTY, STATE. ZIP, PHONE NO. 
^o *>* \oa t o . ^S* "^5 
D*R OF TRAVEL 
COST OF REPAIR 
PHONE( ) 
^^tiT-UQ^Z JL v-r ^HC55 
STREET, CrTY, STATE. ZIP. PHONE NO. 
u5 
PHONE( ) 












UOHTH DAY YEAR 
o i t t 5*/ 
INJURY 





l.PUBUC 3. NONE f T l 
2, COM"L 4. UNKN | | j 
YEARS 
DRIVE EXP. | * L ^ 
UCENSE CLASS ENDORSEMENT 
X 
RESTRKmONS 
A ml 8 
INSURANCE COMPANY EFFECTTVEDATE EXPIRATION OATE POUCY NUMBER 
T i c *i t ^ 8 - ^Z%^HHk 
INSURANCE APPEARS VAUD 
YEsE NO • 
AGENCY THAT SOLD POUCY ADORESS PHONE g « d / 
VEHICLE I YEAR 
<*3 
MA£E MOOEL BOOY STYLE/TYPE CODE 
VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER 
VEHICLE COLOR G.V.W.R. 
X 
DESC. OF CARGO 
COOE X 
DISPOSITION OF VEHICLE 
COOE I - G 
COMMERCIAL VEHICLE (R*g 12.000 tit. or fro**) 
INTERSTATE D I N T R A S T A T E D 
NO. OF AXLES 
(MOUDMa AU. TWULE*» 
_2L 
DIR Of TRAVEL 










RRST INrTlAL LAST STREET. CITY. STA TE. ZIP. PHONE NO. PHONE (&C) ( 




RRST INITIAL LAST STREET. CITY. STATE. ZIP. PHONE NO. PHONE( ) 
DRIVER'S 
UCENSE 
STATE NUMBER DATE 
OF 
BIRTH 
MONTH OAY YEAR 






OLIVER'S l.PUBUC 3. NONE 
EDUCATOR 2. COM\ 4. UNKN ffl YEARS ORIVE EXP. 




INSURANCE COMPANY EFFECTIVE DATE EXPIRATION OATE POUCY NUMBER 
Wl^yelley Police Dita INSURANCE APPEARS VAUD 
YES^I NQ I I 
AGENCY THAT SOLD POUCY ADORESS 
*-\ 






A - L 6 ^ J A £TC A* O 
U i ^ ^ - ^ - V A X O ^ O 
, P ^ P /< iW JTa ^ e» 
5"^^^ l^-i^Y 
l ^ S S u ^ T53.c/-,ULZ-^°G<r 
A-^ C* 
SA-AA-S' 














Reason For No Diagram 
t Otetf not at scane 
2 Vtr»des moved 




i! / -l* o ( . ) , " • - -»re 0WECT1ON 
^C 3<toT^ 
VEHICLE NO 
. * 0 . 
© 
3Soo ' " I 
CIO* 
it' 
OESCRIBE WHAT HAPPENED 
(Refer to Vehicle by Number) 
T: -y 
ESTIMATED TRAVEL SPEED 


















[ E ^ 
1 H _j fen 
fifl^ £fe EU 
INDICATE INTERSECDON TYPE 
-TM Ofr.4* g- /o o ^ 5^oo ^ c ^ ? ^ o ^ e ^ ^ r - ^ u H O Q I J 
H ^ * - g U P T i i ^ e - ^ P i /g-wVx: c ^ ( u^A-!> F ^ C J T ^ ( Q ?Lg-V> 
UJT C^> i4-T*,_ v /evAi :Cu>r TfcT- U J A > t? s / g > o/-** no^ to 3T rO •UCT -H 1 
L ^ r ^ g V/g A-xcu/c- -a* 3 iO^^> j T ^ ^ g o ^ ^ M rr^ - m i ^ jrr/o-nr^ SFETj 
O K x n p ( I 6 T U ^ P L . ^ ^ - C r^ *i c / * 7 ? ^ Q * ) * . \ j g U ^ e i ^ e " T* i cT/o^re^jc 
^ f ^ T ? j i r j T - ^ ^ h V e * * * D o ^ 
h * c JS V-tt S r g - o / w ^ ) y j ^ * ) T3y-y, 
If Hazardous Materials were involved 
list the placard number from off the 
commercial vehicle: 
DAMAGE TO PROPERTY 
OTHER THAN VEHICLES. 
Name object and state nature and amount o< damage ESTIMATE 
Name and address of 
owner or object struck 
WITNESSES { l 
Name 
. Address _, 
. Address . H l o I- v» Cot—rar-*.fa3p«.^ i ^ P . P h o r * _ J O 3 - S 0 £ j L 
FIRST AIO AOMINISTEREO BY cusmspofT MQ 
1 • Policeman 
Z • Fireman 
3 • Ambulance Personnel 
4 •Paramedics 
S-Dooor 
S • Pnvalt Indmduai 
7.Hosprtat 
8 • Hehcopter Personnel 
9 . None Adrwmstered 
0-Unknown 
DJ 
f u $ W€*Q»T WQ 
INJURED TAKEN BY 
1* Ambulance. Private 
2- Ambulance, Fire 
3- Paramedics 
4- Private Vehicle 
5- Hefcopler 
6- Other 
TIME: Amb. Called:. 





SLL Uontn ""uay" 75 
Date Notified of Acodent 
L O L l 
x.o^T 
Time Notified of Acodent 
Amvto at Scene 
Source of Information 




investigation of acodent 
Completed at L T - S O the same day • .day loBowtng 
PHOTCKS) TAKEN 
YES C N O * 
VIDEO TAKEN 
YES Z N O * 
FIELD DIAGRAM 
YES Z NO 5* 
Name_ 
£ Name. 
fc^*>* ?e f C ^ C r J . Charge: . 
, Charge" 
^ e - p L ^ Q i 4 T 
CVSA Inspection Yes^ 
Otner action taken 
If Yes. Report Number_ 
PRINT . V E l o - ? - T i ^ p - ^ c v J v / c V r ) Ag/y^rC •^  / / f t / i t . 
OFFICER'S RANK AND NAME LP. NO. | PATROL DIVISION DEPARTMENT SUPERVISORS APPROVAL) DATE OF REPORT 
State Law requires that report be forwarded to Oept. of Public Safety within 10 days following completion of the investfoatton. MaM ORIGINAL OF REPORT TO: 
Dnver Ucense Division Financial Responsibility Section 4501 South 2700 West » P.O. Box 30560 • Salt Lake City, Utah 84130-0560 
JU 
-Xi 
M U N i r t U M _ 
o~l IS *\U» 
y DAY OF 
£EK M W * 
MILITARY 
TIME 
? LACE WHERE 
ACCIDENT OCCURRED: COUNTY. 
r^  
^ * » l _ T LA-Vi-J 35 
Accident wis oulsida city limits 







CITY OR TOWN . 
W 
D o/ 
l O g y r VAri-ijry 
CITY OR TOWN 
ROAD ON WHICH 
ACCIDENT OCCURRED. I ~ 1 O Q i Q e v RAMP NO 
m 
t AT ITS INTERSECTION WITH , 
G*V€ NAM€ OF STREET OR HIGHWAY NUM6ER INTERSECTION 
TYPE 
2. IF NOT AT INTERSECTION. 
MO«TM S € 
NORTH S E W 
.FEETD • Q D d_ 
TENTH OF A MILE 
a a a a OF MILE POST 
NEAREST INTERSECTION. STREET HOUSE NO lANOUARX 
BE SURE TO COMPLETE IF ROAD HAS MILE POST 
VEHICLE YEAR 
<H 
MAKE MOOEL BOOY STYLE/TY PE CODE 
4 Q loz. 
VEHICLE COLOR 
u3 ^ T T c 
G.V W R. 
V 
OESC OF CARGO 
COOE 
CAS* NUMBER 
FOR AGENCY USE 







COMJCfClM. VEHtCLE ( R ^ 12.000 t « . or mort) 
INTERSTATE D INTRASTATE Q 
VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER 
ZTt-\ \ e>c>i-?-^ l « - o T L S 2 - l 6 
DISPOSITION OF VEHICLE 
COOE 
rfBEF 
NO. OF AXLES 
(MCXUDMS Mi. mOJK) 



















.-o » U 
COST OF REPAIR 2-
STREET. CrTY, STATE. ZIP. PHONE NO. 
l l i o vJ 12-1 & ^ 













UONTH OAY YEAR 
o l ©5 C t EOUWTYPQ 
INJURY 





1 PU8UC 3. NONE 






n i 29 
INSURANCE COMPANY 
JC^> t> 
EFFECTIVE DATE EXPIRATION DATE POUCY 30 
m o t ? ^3 i,j x 
tNSURANCE APPEARS VAUO 
YES 5 ^ NO Q 




VEHICLE YEAR MAKE MODEL BOOY STYLE/TYPE CODE 
J 
VEHICLE COLOR G.VWR. DESC. OF CARGO 
COOE 
COMMERCIAL VEHICLE (Atg 12.000 toi. or won) 
INTERSTATE D INTRASTATED 
VEHICLE IOENTIFICATJON NUMBER DISPOSITION OF VEHICLE 
COOE 
NO. OF AXLES 
QKXiXma Hi. TWJEP& 












FIRST INITIAL LAST STREET. CITY. STATE ZIP. PHONE NO. PHONE{ ) 35 
37 
.38 
















I .PUBUC 3. NONE 
2 C O M ! 4. UNKN • YEAr ^  DRIVE EXP 
UCENSE CLASS ENDORSEMENT 
INSURANCE COMPANY EFFECTIVE DATE EXPIRATION OATE POUCY NUMBER 
INSURANCE APPEARS VAUO 
YESQ NO P I 
AGENCY THAT SOU) POUCY ADORESS PHONE( ) 
1 PEDESTRIAN DATE Of B»RTV4 
Jk. r t e ^ r ^ Y ^ l^ -ot--p<£g.'Tv>Aol <3 1 
CWS( A«A 
rt 
^ORIGINAL REPORT n C I I D O l r i l C M f n •»»*-rn-%r-t-v 
DIAGRAM WHAT HAPPENED BELOW 
Re a ton* For No Diagram 
1 Officer no*«(scene 
2 Vehicle* moved 
3 Other 




V E H I C L E N O . 
ESTIMATEO T R A V E L S P E E D 
ESTIMATED I M P A C T S P E E D 
P O S T E D S P E E O 





t>ef ^ o r - ^ i -
m | i 
A B 










1 H ton 
n 
I N D I C A T E INTERSECTION T Y P E 
DESCRIBE W H A T HAPPENED 
(Refer to Vehicle by Number) 
If Hazardous Materials were involved 
list the placard number from off the 
commercial vehicle: 
S 
0AMAG6 TO PROPERTY 
OTHER THAN VEHICLES. 
Nameipoject and state nature and amount of damage 
Name and address of 
owner of object struck 
ESTIMATE 
W I T N E S S E S 
Name 
Name 
. Address . 
.Address . 
. P h o n e . 
. P h o n e . 
• FIRST AJO ADMINISTERED BY 
1 • Pohceman 
2 * Fireman 
3 * Ambtiance Personnel 
4 •Paramedics 
5-Doctor 
S • Private Indnnduaf 
7 . Hospital 
8-Helicopter 
9 • None Admmrstj 
0 - Unknown 
ens mtrom NO 
D 
CMS mcPowTNo 
INJURED TAKEN BY 
1- Ambulance, Private 
2- Ambulance, Fire 
3-Paramedics 
4- Prtvate Vehide 
S-Helicopter 
6- Other 
TIME: Amb. Catted:. 








Date Notified of Accident 
Time Notified of Acodent 
Armed at Scene 
Source of Information 




Investigation of acodent 
Completed at • the same day • . day fottowmg 
PH0T0(S) TAKEN 




YESC NO a 
Name 
- ' N a m e . . 
. Charge: 
. Cnarge-
CVSA Inspection Yes_ 
Otner action taken 
If Yes. Report N u m t » r _ 
PRINT 
_JS>,^T7» Y u > ^ 
OFFICER'S RANK AND NAME 
E/Un qu^f^^rrr. \J v/e?J> 
ID. NO. PATROL DIVISION 
r&ksr 
DEPARTMENT SUPERVISORS APPROVAU DATE OF REPORT 
nh^lv 
Sui« t w requires that report be forwarded to DepL of Public Safety within 10 days following completion of the Investigation. Mall ORIGINAL OF REPORT TO' 
Driver bcense Division Financial Re«ponaib%. Section 4501 S<)um 2700 West . • . P A Box 30560 • Salt Lake Otv. Utah mxu&n 
Page 
RECORDED STATEMENT SUMMARY 
:IA:M N-YM3ER g q . 0<\P*. qm
 I N P E R S 0 N 
:-^:M HZP. ^ ^HL A - ^ o ^ ^ £ s ^ E L E P H 0 N E 
MAMS 
ADDRESS 
[ U > U < Q . v^ooU{W,J g„ STATUS ^ \ 
• -i n . i V 
AGE 
< l - g ft J PHONE 2,£<V £>7> I f 
WORK
 17^-^fr-
CONTROL DIRECTION OF TRAVEL/STREETS 
ID TRAVEL SPEED ID IMPACT SPEED ID 
CD TRAVEL SPEED CD IMPACT SPEED CD 
SUMMARY OF FACTS: ,
 n \T^^° 
DOL: -ifI 8 / ^ 7 ^ TIME: ff- To ^b\A • LOCATION: f^ - ( 
POLICE DEPART: 4?f^ (pdC ? O - OFFICER: TICKETS: 
WITNESS: jfrfcX -[r-fclhAsldfA ' PHONE: 
VEHICLE: / 4 "^  1 "f<7^ REGISTERED OWNER: {Hfr-^M f ^ a u i » ~ 
FACTS^ ffi I f\j£ZZh (U^ W /f&6f t L\J-&% •&>/ ^ U ^ / 
PURPOSE OF TRAVEL: 
PASSENGERS: NAME: ^[pvS - PHONE: 
INJURIES CLAIMED:, , fj of-1/^iW^A • 
^ol<— .(M-J l^V" MvA~^ 
MEDICAL PROVIDERS THIS LOSS: 
LOSS OF INCOME ALLEGED (SALARY, DAYS LOST, DOCTORS EXCUSE): 
SERVICES: Y N 
DESCRIPTION OF JOB DUTIES AND TITLE: 
PREVIOUS OR SUBSEQUENT MVA, WC, OR OTHER INJURIES: 
ALL MEDICAL PROVIDERS 10 YEARS PRIOR TO THIS LOSS: 
